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Arbitration Case Law Update 2016 
 
Jill I. Gross1 
July 15, 2016 
 
This chapter2 identifies decisions by the U.S. Supreme 
Court and selected federal and high state courts in the past year 
that interpret and apply the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).3  This 
chapter also analyzes the impact some of these cases might have 
on securities arbitration practice. 
 
I. SUPREME COURT 
 
Since last year’s update,4 the Supreme Court decided one 
case involving the FAA and granted petitions for a writ of 
certiorari in four others:  of those four, the Court immediately 
vacated judgments in three of the cases and the parties settled the 
fourth before the Court could rule.  This section describes those 
cases. 
 
                                                 
1 Professor of Law, Elisabeth Haub School of Law, Pace University. 
2 I am grateful for the able research assistance of Rana Marie Abihabib, 
J.D. Pace Law School, May 2016, and Michael Liik, J.D. Candidate, Pace 
Law School, May 2017. 
3 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (2014).  Because disputes resolved through 
securities arbitration necessarily “involve commerce” (FAA § 2), courts 
apply the FAA to legal issues arising out of securities arbitrations. See 
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002).   
4 My arbitration law updates for the PLI Securities Arbitration Course 
Book for the years 2011 to 2016 can be accessed at 
http://ssrn.com/author=485809.  The 2015 update is dated May 27, 2015, 
so this year’s chapter covers almost fourtheen months of cases. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2847858 
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Under the Supreme Court’s FAA preemption doctrine, the 
FAA preempts any state law or rule that conflicts with the policies 
and purposes underlying the FAA.5  Those policies and purposes 
include the requirement that courts place arbitration contracts “on 
equal footing with all other contracts.”6   
 
As predicted in last year’s update, in DIRECTV, Inc. v. 
Imburgia,7 the Supreme Court held once again that the FAA 
preempted a state court’s interpretation of its own law – in this 
case the California Court of Appeal.  The California court had held 
that a California choice of law clause in the parties’ service 
contract (which contract the parties agreed was governed by the 
FAA) prevailed over the federal law-based FAA preemption 
doctrine.8   
 
In DIRECTV, consumers filed a class action in state court 
against the satellite television service provider alleging it charged 
early termination fees in violation of various California statutes.9  
The form contract governing the satellite service contained a pre-
                                                 
5 See Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S.Ct. 1201 (2012) 
(holding that the FAA preempts West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals 
rule that voided as against public policy arbitration clauses in nursing 
home contracts with respect to negligence claims); AT&T Mobility LLC 
v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (ruling that FAA preempts state law 
unconscionability defense that declares class action waivers in consumer 
arbitration agreements per se unconscionable as inconsistent with the 
FAA). 
6 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006). The 
doctrine stems from the “savings clause” contained within FAA §2, 
which preserves defenses to the enforcement of arbitration agreements on 
“grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”  
9 U.S.C. §2. 
7 136 S.Ct. 463 (2015). 
8 See Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 190 (2014), rev’d, 
136 S.Ct. 463 (2015). 
9 DIRECTV, 136 S.Ct. at 466. 
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dispute arbitration agreement (PDAA), a class action waiver, and a 
choice of law clause that provided: 
 
The interpretation and enforcement of this 
Agreement shall be governed by the rules and regulations 
of the Federal Communications Commission, other 
applicable federal laws, and the laws of the state and local 
area where Service is provided to you.  This Agreement is 
subject to modification if required by such laws. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Section 9 [the arbitration 
clause including class action waiver] shall be governed by 
the Federal Arbitration Act.10 
 
The class action waiver clause added: “If, however, the law of your 
state would find this agreement to dispense with class arbitration 
procedures unenforceable, then this entire Section 9 is 
unenforceable.”11   
 
 Based on this sentence in the class action waiver clause, 
defendant did not initially move to compel arbitration because the 
governing law of California at the time—known as the Discover 
Bank rule12—would have voided the PDAA as unconscionable due 
to the class action waiver.  However, after the Supreme Court held 
in Concepcion that the FAA preempted California’s Discover Bank 
rule, defendant moved to compel individual arbitration.13 
 
 The trial court denied the motion and the California Court 
of Appeal affirmed.  The Court of Appeal interpreted the class 
                                                 
10 DIRECTV, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d at 193 (quoting parties’ agreement). 
11 Id.  
12 Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005) 
(classifying most class action waivers in consumer contracts as 
unconscionable). 
13 DIRECTV, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d at 193. 
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action waiver provision and found that reigning California law 
“would find this agreement to dispense with class arbitration 
procedures unenforceable.”14  As a result, the entire PDAA was not 
enforceable, according to the precise language of the contract.  The 
court rejected defendant’s argument that Discover Bank was no 
longer state law because it was preempted, and instead accepted 
plaintiffs’ argument that it should interpret state law without 
regard to FAA preemption.15 
 
Because the California Court of Appeal’s decision 
conflicted with a Ninth Circuit holding that the FAA preemption 
doctrine supersedes the parties’ choice of law clause,16 DIRECTV 
sought review in the U.S. Supreme Court (the California Supreme 
Court had denied its request for review.)17  The Supreme Court 
agreed to decide the question:  “Whether the California Court of 
Appeal erred by holding, in direct conflict with the Ninth Circuit, 
that a reference to state law in an arbitration agreement governed 
by the Federal Arbitration Act requires the application of state law 
preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act.”18 
 
 Acknowledging in its majority opinion that interpretation 
of contracts is a matter of state law, the Supreme Court framed the 
issue not as whether the state court’s interpretation was correct, but 
whether it was consistent with the FAA.19  The Court reasoned that 
the California Court of Appeal’s decision that “the law of your 
state” included “invalid California law” (i.e., the Discover Bank 
                                                 
14 Id.  
15 Id. at 194-97. 
16 See Murphy v. DirecTV, Inc., 724 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2013). 
17 DIRECTV, 136 S.Ct. at 467. 
18 Pet. for Writ of Cert., DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 2014 WL 5359805, 
*i (2014). 
19 DIRECTV, 136 S.Ct. at 468. 
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rule) was a decision unique to arbitration contracts.20  As a result, 
the Court concluded that the California Court of Appeal’s 
interpretation of the parties’ choice of law clause did not place 
arbitration contracts on equal footing with all other contracts and 
was thus preempted by the FAA.21  
 
This predictable outcome in DIRECTV follows from the 
Court’s extremely broad application of the FAA preemption 
doctrine in recent years.  It also signals the Court’s continued 
impatience with state courts that attempt to circumvent the FAA by 
finding a state law basis to invalidate an arbitration agreement.22  
 
After DIRECTV, the Supreme Court granted petitions for 
writs of certiorari in four other arbitration-related cases.  However, 
again showing impatience for state courts that seemingly ignore 
the FAA, in all four cases, the Court summarily vacated the 
underlying judgments and remanded the cases back to the state 
                                                 
20 Id. at 469.  The Court analyzed California law and concluded that a 
California court would not interpret “law of your state” to include 
invalidated law in any context other than arbitration.  Id. at 469-71. 
21 Id. at 471. 
22 Id. at 468 (“The Federal Arbitration Act is a law of the United States, 
and Concepcion is an authoritative interpretation of that Act.  
Consequently the judges of every State must follow it.”); see also Nitro-
Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500, 501 (2012) (holding that 
FAA preempts Oklahoma Supreme Court’s ruling and stating that, when 
interpreting the FAA, “it is a matter of great importance, therefore, that 
state supreme courts adhere to a correct interpretation of the legislation. 
Here, the Oklahoma Supreme Court failed to do so”); Marmet Health 
Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1202 (2012) (holding that FAA 
preempts Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia’s ruling and stating 
that “[w]hen this Court has fulfilled its duty to interpret federal law, a 




court for “further consideration in light of [DIRECTV].”23  All four 
cases arose from state high courts that declared a PDAA 
unconscionable under state law.  In Spencer, the Supreme Court of 
Appeals of West Virginia had found a PDAA in a construction 
contract unconscionable despite the presence of a delegation clause 
that purported to delegate questions of arbitrability to the 
arbitrator.24  In the three related Hawaii cases, the Supreme Court 
of Hawaii had declared the same PDAA in a “condominium 
declaration” ambiguous with respect to the condominium owners’ 
intent to arbitrate, and unconscionable because of its limitations on 
discovery and punitive damages, and its confidentiality clause.25  
Presumably, with the remand, the Court was instructing these state 
courts that they did not sufficiently consider the FAA preemption 
doctrine in reaching their decisions. 
 
Before DIRECTV, the Supreme Court agreed to hear a 
case stemming from a federal Court of Appeal’s apparent refusal 
to apply the FAA preemption doctrine, but the parties settled the 
                                                 
23 See Schumacher Homes of Circleville, Inc. v. Spencer, 136 S.Ct. 1157 
(2016) (remanding to Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia); Ritz-
Carlton Development Co. v. Narayan, 136 S.Ct. 800 (2016) (remanding 
to Supreme Court of Hawaii); Ritz-Carlton Development Co. v. Narayan, 
and Ritz-Carlton Development Co. v. Nath, 136 S.Ct. 799 (2016) 
(remanding both cases to Supreme Court of Hawaii).  
24 See Schumacher Homes of Circleville, Inc. v. Spencer, 774 S.E.2d 1 
(W.Va. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1157 (2016).  On remand, the West 
Virginia high court concluded that defendant waived its right to challenge 
the delegation clause, and thus referred the case to arbitration for an 
arbitrability determination.  Schumacher Homes of Circleville, Inc. v. 
Spencer, __ S.E.2d __, 2016 WL 3475631 (W.Va. June 13, 2016). 
25 See Narayan v. Ritz-Carlton Dev. Co., 350 P.3d 995 (Haw. 2015), 
vacated, 136 S. Ct. 800 (2016); Nath v. Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co., 356 P.3d 
1043 (Haw. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 799 (2016); Narayan v. Marriott 
Intern., 350 P.3d 1043 (Haw. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 799 (2016).  
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case before the Court could rule.26  In Zaborowski, the Ninth 
Circuit found a PDAA in an employment contract unconscionable 
and, applying a California rule that allows courts not to sever 
offending parts of a PDAA if it is “permeated” by 
unconscionability,27 declared the arbitration agreement 
unenforceable.28  Petitioners sought review on the ground that the 
Ninth Circuit should have held the FAA preempted the 
Armendariz rule because California applies a more lenient 
severability doctrine to ordinary contracts as opposed to that 
applied to arbitration contracts.29  
 
II. FEDERAL AND STATE COURT 
DECISIONS  
 
The remainder of this chapter summarizes decisions from 
lower federal courts and state high courts applying the Supreme 
Court’s FAA jurisprudence when ruling on challenges to the 
arbitrability of a particular dispute and on motions to confirm or 
vacate arbitration awards.  Where applicable, the chapter will 
discuss implications for FINRA arbitration. 
 
 A. Who Decides Arbitrability? 
 
It is well-settled that courts, not arbitrators, decide 
challenges to the substantive arbitrability of a dispute “’unless the 
                                                 
26 MHN Government Services, Inc. v. Zaborowski, 136 S.Ct. 27 (2015), 
cert. dismissed, 136 S. Ct. 1539 (2016). 
27 See Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services., Inc., 6 P.3d 
669 (Cal. 2000). 
28 See Zaborowski v. MHN Gov't Servs., Inc., 601 F. App’x 461 (9th Cir. 
2014), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 27 (2015), and cert. dismissed, 136 S. Ct. 
1539 (2016). 
29 Pet. for Writ of Cert., MHN Government Services, Inc. v. Zaborowski, 
2015 WL 3637766 (U.S. June 10, 2015). 
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parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise.’”30  The 
majority of lower courts considering this question find that the 
incorporation by reference of a forum’s rules that empower 
arbitrators to decide substantive arbitrability constitutes such “clear 
and unmistakable evidence.”31  
 
However, this past year in the FINRA context, in Morgan 
Stanley & Co., LLC v. Couch,32 one district court concluded that 
“incorporation of the FINRA rules into the Arbitration Clause does 
not provide clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties 
intended to submit the issue of arbitrability to arbitration.”33  In 
Couch, an industry employment dispute, the firm argued that the 
financial advisor (FA) had waived his right to arbitrate, because he 
first litigated his claims in court for more than one year.  Before 
deciding that the FA had indeed waived his right to arbitration, the 
district court concluded that the issue was one for the court to 
decide—not the arbitrator— because it could not locate a FINRA 
                                                 
30 Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S 79, 83 (2002). 
31 E.g., Brennan v. Opus Bank, 796 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(incorporation of AAA rules); Considine v. Brookdale Senior Living, 
Inc., 124 F. Supp.3d 83, 91 (D. Conn. 2015) (incorporation of AAA 
rules); Adtile Techs. Inc. v. Perion Network Ltd., __ F. Supp.3d __, No. 
CV 15-1193-SLR, 2016 WL 3475335, at *6 (D. Del. June 24, 2016) 
(incorporation of JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules). But see 
Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC, 809 F.3d 746 (3d 
Cir. 2016) (incorporation of AAA rules is not “clear and unmistakable” 
evidence parties intended to delegate issue of class arbitrability to 
arbitrators); Global Client Solutions, LLC. v. Ossello, 367 P.3d 361 
(Mont. 2016) (incorporation by reference of AAA rules is not “clear and 
unmistakable” evidence that parties intended arbitrators to decide 
arbitrability). 
32134 F. Supp. 3d 1215 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (holding that court would decide 
whether employee waived his right to arbitrate).  
33Id. at 1226.  
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arbitration rule comparable to the AAA rule that arbitrators have 
the power to decide their own jurisdiction.34 
 
In light of Couch, if firms want to delegate a substantive 
arbitrability determination to FINRA arbitrators rather than courts, 
they should include a more specific delegation clause rather than 
rely on incorporating by reference FINRA arbitration rules. 
 
B. Defenses to Arbitrability 
 
Once deciding questions of arbitrability, courts must apply 
the Moses H. Cone presumption of arbitrability,35 but compel 
arbitration of only those disputes that the parties contracted to 
submit to arbitration.  Thus, courts must construe the terms of the 
parties’ arbitration agreement like any other contract to give effect 
to the parties’ intent.36  This section turns to substantive 




 Courts sometimes conclude that a particular dispute is not 
encompassed within the scope of the parties’ arbitration 
agreements.  For example, in Lloyd v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. 
& Chase Investment Services Corp.,37 the Second Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s conclusion that plaintiffs’ claims fell outside the 
scope of the parties’ arbitration agreement.  In Lloyd, plaintiffs, 
former employees of the affiliated defendants, brought a 
                                                 
34 Id.  
35 See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 
U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (instructing courts to presume a dispute is arbitrable). 
36 See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 682 
(2010) (stating that “as with any other contract, the parties’ intentions 
control”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
37 791 F.3d 265 (2d Cir. 2015). 
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class/collective action in district court alleging violations of state 
(class) and federal (collective) overtime laws.  Defendants moved 
to compel arbitration and argued that the arbitration agreements, 
which plaintiffs had entered into via their employment agreements 
and executed Form U4s, required plaintiffs to submit to FINRA 
arbitration.38  The arbitration agreements provided that: 
 
 Any claim or controversy concerning you arising out of or 
in connection with the business activities of [Chase], your 
activities and/or your appointment as a registered 
representative or your employment and/or the termination 
thereof required to be arbitrated by the FINRA Rules shall 
be resolved by individual (not class or collective) 
arbitration in accordance with the Code of Arbitration 
Procedure of the FINRA..., and in accordance with 
applicable law.... Further, no claims shall be arbitrated on 
a class or collective action or collective or class-wide 
basis.39 
 
The district court denied the motion to compel on the 
ground that plaintiffs’ class claims fell outside the scope of their 
arbitration agreement; the Second Circuit agreed.40  Since class or 
collective action claims are prohibited under FINRA Rule 13204, 
plaintiffs were not required to arbitrate their claims in the FINRA 
                                                 
38 Id. at 266-69.   
39 Id. at 268 (emphasis in original).  Notably, the agreement prevented 
plaintiffs only from asserting their claims in FINRA arbitration, not from 
asserting their claims in court. 
40 Id. at 269. 
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forum. Thus, plaintiffs were not subject to the parties’ arbitration 
agreement governed by FINRA rules.41  
 
This case is significant because the holding effectively 
nullifies the class and collective arbitration waiver that the firm 
inserted in its PDAA in its employment agreement with its FAs.  
Chase clearly wanted to avoid class and collective claims and 
wanted to arbitrate disputes with employees.  By using the 
language quoted above, the firm not only faces class and collective 
claims, it has to face them in court.     
 
 2. Contrary Congressional Command 
 
Even if a dispute falls within the scope of an arbitration 
agreement, courts can refuse to enforce the agreement as to federal 
statutory claims if “the FAA’s mandate has been ‘overridden by a 
contrary Congressional command.’”42   
 
In Cohen v. UBS Financial Services,43 the Second Circuit 
rejected an employee’s argument that FINRA Rule 13204, which 
bars class and collective claims in FINRA arbitration in intra-
industry cases, is a “contrary Congressional command” that 
                                                 
41 Id. at 271-73.  The court also ruled that incorporation by reference of 
FINRA arbitration rules invokes the rule in effect at the time of the 
arbitration, not the rule in effect when the parties entered into the 
agreement.  Id. at 273. 
42 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S.Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013) 
(citing CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S.Ct. 665, 668-69 (2012)) 
(second internal citation omitted).  For example, Dodd-Frank §922 
declares that PDAAs purporting to require arbitration of whistleblower 
claims arising under Sarbanes-Oxley are not enforceable. 18 U.S.C. § 
1514A(e)(2) (2012). 
43 799 F.3d 174, 175 (2d Cir. 2015).   
12 
 
supersedes the FAA’s command to enforce PDAAs as written, 
even if they contain a class action waiver. 
   
Cohen, an FA with UBS Financial Services, Inc. (UBS), 
filed a putative class and collection action alleging federal and 
state wage-and-hour claims against UBS in the United States 
District Court for the Central District of California.44  The case was 
transferred to the Southern District of New York, and the 
complaint was amended to add other employees of UBS.45 
 
UBS moved to stay the action and compel arbitration, 
asserting that plaintiffs’ employment agreements included an 
enforceable PDAA with a class action waiver.  Cohen–not 
disputing that he had entered into an arbitration agreement that 
covered all of his claims–opposed the motion, arguing that FINRA 
Rule 13204 is a “contrary Congressional commend” that bars UBS 
from enforcing the arbitration agreement as well as the class and 
collective action waivers.46  The district court agreed with UBS 
and stayed the court case pending FINRA arbitration.47 
 
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed.  The Court of 
Appeals concluded that enforcement of the PDAA would not be 
“’contrary’ to Rule 13204 because the Rule bars neither the 
enforcement of pre-dispute waivers of class and collective action 
procedures nor the arbitration of Cohen’s individual claims.”48  
The court further stated: “True, the Rule bars arbitration of a claim 
so long as it is embedded in a class action or collective action; but 
it does not preserve the right to assert a claim in class or collective 
                                                 
44 Id. at 176. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 177-78. 
47 Id.  
48 Id. at 178. 
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form notwithstanding a contractual waiver.”49  The court noted that 
class/collective action waivers are “conceptually distinct” from 
PDAAs.50  Thus, the court concluded that Rule 13204 does not 
prohibit the enforcement of class and collective action waivers.51 
 
In the labor context, the Seventh Circuit recently 
concluded that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 
precludes enforcement of a collective action waiver as protected 
“concerted action.”52  However, because the court concluded that 
the NLRA did not conflict with the FAA in that context (because 
the arbitration agreement was unenforceable under state law as 
illegal and thus covered by the FAA’s savings clause), the court 
did not need to decide whether the NLRA is a “contrary 
Congressional command.”53  The Seventh Circuit’s approach sets 
up a conflict with other circuits that have concluded the NLRA 
does not void class/collective action waivers in labor contracts.54  
                                                 
49 Id.   
50 Id. at 179.  The court also noted that FINRA does not restrict the 
content of firms’ PDAAs with their employees (only those with their 
customers).  Id. 
51 Id. at 180.  In contrast, FINRA has held that, in the customer context, 
FINRA Rule 12204 is a “contrary Congressional command” that 
supersedes the FAA, and thus barred broker-dealers from inserting class 
action waivers in their customer agreements.  See Dep’t of Enforcement 
v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., Disc. Proc. No. 2011029760201 (FINRA 
Office of Hearing Officers Feb. 21, 2013).  
52 See Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., __ F.3d __, No. 15-2997, 2016 WL 
3029464 (7th Cir. May 26, 2016).  
53 Id. at *6. 
54 See Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015); 
Cellular Sales of Missouri LLC v.  NLRB, __ F.3d __, No. 15-1620 and 




   3. Effective Vindication Doctrine  
 
Another defense to arbitrability asserted by disputants is 
that a court should not enforce an arbitration agreement because 
enforcement would prevent them from vindicating their statutory 
rights.  The Supreme Court limited this “effective vindication” 
doctrine to cases where claimants can establish they are stripped of 
the right to pursue statutory rights, not the ability to pursue them.55  
Since Italian Colors, lower federal courts enforce class action 
waivers in PDAAs against an “ineffective vindication” challenge.56  
 
On the other hand, several courts have refused to enforce 
other aspects of arbitration agreements under the effective 
vindication doctrine.  In Hayes v. Delbert Services Corp.,57 
plaintiffs brought a putative class action against a payday lending 
company asserting that the company’s lending practices violated 
various state and federal lending laws.  The PDAA in the parties’ 
loan agreement provided that the agreement was subject only to 
Indian law and not applicable state and federal law.58  The Fourth 
Circuit concluded that the clause, which expressly forbid plaintiffs 
from invoking protections guaranteed to them under federal law, 
was unenforceable under the effective vindication doctrine.59 
 
Similarly, in Nesbitt v. FCNH, Inc.,60 a massage therapy 
student brought a putative class action in federal district court 
                                                 
55 Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 
2311 (2013). 
56 See, e.g., Kaspers v. Comcast Corp., 631 F. App'x 779, 783-84 (11th 
Cir. 2015). 
57 811 F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2016). 
58 Id. at 668-89. 
59 Id. at 675. 
60 811 F.3d 371 (10th Cir. 2016). 
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against the operator of massage therapy schools for violations of 
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for failing to pay students for 
performing massages on customers.61  The student enrollment 
agreement contained a PDAA providing for arbitration at the 
American Arbitration Association pursuant to its commercial 
arbitration rules. Those rules provide, among other things, that 
each party bears its own arbitration expenses.  The PDAA also 
stated that each party would bear its own attorney’s fees.62  
 
The district court denied defendants’ motion to compel 
arbitration, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed under the effective 
vindication doctrine.63  The Court of Appeals noted that plaintiff’s 
affidavit stated that she could not afford the forum fees.  The court 
also noted that the arbitration agreement was ambiguous as to 
whether the arbitrators were permitted to ignore the fee-shifting 
provisions of the FLSA.64  The court concluded that “’it is unlikely 
that an employee in [the plaintiff’s] position, faced with the mere 
possibility of being reimbursed for arbitrator fees in the future, 
would risk advancing those fees in order to access the arbitral 
forum.” As a result, the court held that the arbitration agreement 
precluded plaintiff from vindicating her statutory rights and was 
thus unenforceable.65 
 
Because the Supreme Court has never expressly 
invalidated an arbitration agreement under the “effective 
vindication” doctrine, it remains to be seen precisely what type of 
                                                 
61 Id. at 373. 
62 Id. at 374. 
63 Id. at 375. 
64 Id. at 379-80. 
65 Id. at 380-81. 
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right-stripping provision in an arbitration agreement the Court 
would view as rendering the agreement unenforceable. 
 
 4. State law defenses 
 
Finally, as stated above,66 the FAA’s “savings clause” 
preserves ordinary state law defenses to the enforcement of any 
contract as viable challenges to arbitrability, as long as that defense 
does not discriminate against arbitration contracts.  This section 
identifies those defenses and some recent cases interpreting them. 
 
i. Lack of Mutual Assent 
 
One state law-based defense parties invoke to challenge 
the enforceability of an arbitration agreement is lack of mutual 
assent.  Federal courts occasionally examine this defense in the 
context of a “click-wrap” agreement, where an online purchaser 
must click a box to complete a purchase, and that “click” then 
binds the consumer to certain terms of service.  While most click-
wrap agreements are enforced, the Seventh Circuit recently refused 
to enforce an arbitration clause contained in a click-wrap 
agreement, reasoning that the purchaser did not receive ample 
notice of the terms of the clause through the act of clicking.67    
 
Online brokerage firms should ensure that customers who 
open accounts online necessarily must see the full account 
agreement including any PDAA when they go through the process 
                                                 
66 See supra Part I. 
67 See Sgouros v. TransUnion Corp., 817 F.3d 1029, 1035-36 (7th Cir. 
2016) (affirming district court’s refusal to enforce an online agreement 
where the user did not get clear notice of its terms by clicking through the 
“I accept” button). 
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of opening an account.  This could insulate the firm from 
challenges to the PDAA on the ground of lack of mutual assent. 
 
ii. Unconscionability  
 
While the Supreme Court in Concepcion barred lower 
courts from finding class action waivers in arbitration agreements 
to be per se substantively unconscionable under state law, lower 
courts continue to strike down select arbitration clauses as 
unconscionable on other grounds.68   
 
However, in the securities arbitration context, because the 
Securities and Exchange Commission has substantial oversight of 
the arbitration process and rules and FINRA regulates the content 
of PDAAs in customer agreements,69 it is unlikely a court would 
conclude that a PDAA in a customer agreement that complies with 
FINRA Rule 2268 is unconscionable.  
 
iii. Waiver  
 
Another state law-based defense to the obligation to 
arbitrate is the waiver doctrine.  Under this doctrine, one party to 
an arbitration clause claims the other party waived its right to 
arbitrate based on conduct in related litigation.  While the 
arbitration waiver test varies slightly among the federal circuits 
and states, courts typically consider factors such as: (1) the time 
elapsed from commencement of litigation to the request for 
                                                 
68 See, e.g., Global Client Solutions, LLC. v. Ossello, 367 P.3d 361 
(Mont. 2016) (affirming lower court’s finding that PDAA in a debt 
collection plan was unconscionable because obligations of parties to 
arbitrate disputes were not mutual). Cf. Merkin v. Vonage Am., Inc., 639 
F. App’x 481 (9th Cir. 2016) (enforcing arbitration clause but severing 
unconscionable language). 
69 See FINRA R. 2268. 
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arbitration; (2) the amount and nature of litigation, including 
substantive motions and discovery; and (3) prejudice to the party 
opposing arbitration.70  
 
 This past year, courts continued to examine these factors 
when ruling on waiver arguments.  For example, in Grigsby & 
Associates, Inc. v. M. Securities Inv.,71 underwriters of a 
municipal bond offering sought to enjoin arbitration with co-
underwriters on the ground that respondents waived their right to 
arbitrate the dispute.  
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment 
that the co-underwriters did not waive their right to arbitrate the 
dispute. In so ruling, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that “a party 
who ‘substantially invokes the litigation machinery prior to 
demanding arbitration may waive its right to arbitrate.’”72 
However, the court noted that the lawsuits respondents had filed 
before the arbitration were insubstantial, in that they largely did 
not progress past the filing stage.73  Moreover, the fact that 
respondents waited for ten years after the offering to seek 
arbitration did not in and of itself constitute a waiver.74  Finally, 
petitioners did not show they suffered any prejudice from 
respondents’ litigation conduct.  Therefore, the Court of Appeals 
found that petitioners failed to meet their heavy burden of proving 
                                                 
70 See, e.g., Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, P.A. v. NCR Corp., 
376 F. App’x 70, 71 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Zuckerman Spaeder, LLP v. 
Auffenberg, 646 F.3d 919, 924 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“By this opinion we 
alert the bar in this Circuit that failure to invoke arbitration at the first 
available opportunity will presumptively extinguish a client's ability later 
to opt for arbitration.”). 
71 635 F. App’x 728 (11th Cir. 2015). 
72 Id. at 731. 
73 Id. at 732. 
74 Id. at 733. 
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that respondents acted so inconsistently with their right to arbitrate 
as to constitute waiver.75  
In contrast, the Tenth Circuit found that a disputant had 
waived its right to arbitrate in In re Cox Enterprises, Inc. Set-top 
Cable Television Box Antitrust Litig.76  In that case, a putative 
antitrust class action, defendant cable company moved to compel 
arbitration two years after plaintiffs filed the action.77  During that 
two-year time frame, the plaintiffs fought off motions to dismiss, 
sought (and achieved) class certification, and engaged in extensive 
discovery with defendant.  Defendant did not inform the district 
court of the existence of the PDAAs in the cable subscribers’ 
service agreements at the class certification stage.  Instead, 
defendant moved to compel arbitration the same day it filed its 
motion for summary judgment.78  The district court denied 
defendant’s motion to compel, finding that defendant’s “failure to 
inform it about the presence of the arbitration agreements until 
after certification was inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate and 
suggested ‘an attempt to manipulate the process, or at least to 
attempt multiple bites at the apple.’”79  Based on that fact as well 
as other factors, including prejudice to plaintiffs and the judicial 
process, the Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of waiver.80 
                                                 
75 Id. at 734; see also Hoover Gen. Contractors-Homewood, Inc. v. Key, 
__ So.3d __, No. 1141208, 2016 WL 687070, *4 (Ala. Feb. 19, 2016) 
(contractor did not waive its right to enforce arbitration clause by moving 
to compel arbitration six months after complaint was filed where its 
“participation in [the] case consists of filing three separate pleadings, 
twice moving to continue the pretrial conference, and filing 
counterclaims”). 
76  790 F.3d 1112, 1116 (10th Cir. 2015). 
77 Id. at 1115. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 1116 (quoting district court). 
80 Id. at 1120-21; see also Principal Investments, Inc. v. Harrison, 366 
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If arbitration has not been ruled out as desirable, 
practitioners in this field should be cognizant of taking too many 
steps in a litigation so as to avoid inadvertently waiving any right 
to arbitrate the dispute. 
iv. Nonsignatories to Arbitration 
Agreements 
 
Some parties resist arbitration on the ground that they did 
not sign the relevant arbitration agreement.  However, courts 
sometimes compel nonsignatories to arbitrate under various state 
law contract doctrines.81  For example, in Akpele v. Pac. Life Ins. 
Co.,82 plaintiff, a widow who learned that she had not been 
designated as her husband’s beneficiary in three of his retirement 
accounts, brought suit against Pacific Life Insurance Company, 
Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., two of Oppenheimer’s agents and the 
temporary administrator of her husband’s estate. In opening his 
first two accounts, plaintiff’s deceased husband had signed a client 
agreement containing a PDAA that was binding on successors. The 
district court required plaintiff to arbitrate her dispute before a 
FINRA panel.83 The panel ruled in favor of Oppenheimer and one 
of its agents. The district court confirmed the award.84  
 
On appeal, plaintiff argued, inter alia, that she was not 
bound by the arbitration clause because “she did not benefit from, 
                                                 
P.3d 688 (Nev. 2016) (denying payday loan company’s motion to compel 
arbitration on ground that it had waived its right to arbitrate). 
81 See Arthur Andersen LLP v Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624 (2009) (holding 
that, under the FAA, state law principles may permit an arbitration 
agreement to be enforced by or against a nonsignatory). 
82 __ F. App’x __, No. 15-11529, 2016 WL 1319354 (11th Cir. Apr. 5, 
2016). 




consent to, or ratify an action of her husband that would bind her 
under the client agreement.”85  The district court reasoned, and the 
Court of Appeals affirmed, that she was bound by the agreement as 
a “successor” under both federal and state law.86  
 
Likewise, in Evans v. Bayles,87 the Supreme Court of 
Appeals of West Virginia compelled a widow to arbitrate claims 
arising out of her deceased husband’s Ameriprise brokerage 
account even though the account agreement containing the PDAA 
was not signed.88  Her husband had signed an IRA Application, 
which included an acknowledgement that the client had received 
and read the Brokerage Client Agreement, and that the agreement 
included a PDAA.  However, he never signed the Brokerage 
Agreement itself.  The Supreme Court of Appeals ruled the 
arbitration agreement was incorporated by reference into the IRA 
Application, which he did sign.89  Thus, the court required his 
widow to arbitrate her dispute over the payout of the proceeds of 
her late husband’s account. 
 
Some courts are unwilling to enforce an arbitration 
agreement against a nonsignatory if there is no evidence that the 
nonsignatory actually knew of the agreement, nor any evidence it 
received a tangible or direct benefit from it.  For example, in 
Pershing, L.L.C. v. Bevis,90 plaintiffs were a group of 16 investors 
                                                 
85 Id. at *3. 
86 Id. at *4-5; see also Tamsco Props., LLC v. Langemeier, 597 F. App'x 
428 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming lower court’s grant of motion to compel 
arbitration of nonsignatories whose agents attended conferences 
sponsored by the defendants and signed PDAAs at those conferences on 
investors’ behalf). 
87 No. 15-0600, 2016 W. Va. LEXIS 427, at *1 (June 1, 2016). 
88 Id. at *5. 
89 Id. at *15. 




who bought Stanford certificates of deposit (CDs) from the now 
infamous Stanford Ponzi scheme.91  Pershing was Stanford’s 
clearing broker during the relevant time period.  The 16 investors 
along with 84 others who invested in the CDs commenced a 
FINRA arbitration against Pershing, alleging Pershing had played 
a material role in defrauding them.92  Pershing did not resist 
arbitration with the 84 investors, as they had used Pershing’s 
services in purchasing the CDs.  However, Pershing persuaded the 
district court to enjoin the group of 16 from arbitrating their claims 
against it, as Pershing had no contractual relation with them; 
rather, they had purchased their CDs directly through the bank or 
Stanford’s trust company.  The Fifth Circuit agreed, refusing to 
compel arbitration of Pershing as a nonsignatory.93 
 
5.  Unavailability of forum  
 
Another defense to arbitrability is that the forum 
designated in the PDAA is unavailable.  The Eleventh Circuit 
refused to compel arbitration of a dispute that was subject to an 
arbitration clause because the designated forum was not available.  
In Flagg v. First Premier Bank,94 plaintiff filed a class action 
lawsuit against First Premier Bank, alleging that defendant  
facilitated illegal transactions of online payday lenders.95  
Plaintiff’s loan agreement included a PDAA that stated that all 
disputes were to be resolved “by and under the Code of Procedure 
of the National Arbitration Forum [NAF].”96  However, NAF 
                                                 
91 Id. at 756. 
92 Id. at 755. 
93 Id. at 758. 
94 __ F. App’x __, No. 15-14052, 2016 WL 703063 (11th Cir. Feb. 23, 
2016). 




declined plaintiff’s request to arbitrate her claim, as it had not been 
accepting consumer arbitration claims since 2009.97 
 
Plaintiff then sued in federal district court.  Defendant, 
arguing that §5 of the FAA requires the appointment of a substitute 
for NAF,98 moved to compel arbitration and appoint a substitute 
forum, and to stay or dismiss the proceedings.99 The district court 
denied defendant’s motion.100  
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the forum 
selection “was an integral part of the agreement to arbitrate.”101  If 
the selected forum is not available, the court would not enforce the 
arbitration agreement. 
 
6.  Arbitration “has been had” under FAA 
section 3 
 
Under FAA §3, upon motion of a party, a district court 
must stay court proceedings on issues subject to arbitration “until 
such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the 
agreement.”102  In Tillman v. Tillman,103 the Ninth Circuit 
permitted a lawsuit to go forward in court despite the existence of 
a valid arbitration agreement because the arbitrator had dismissed 
the arbitration after one party could not afford to pay her share of 
                                                 
97 Id. 
98 FAA §5 “requires the [court’s] appointment of a substitute arbitrator 
when the arbitrator designated by the parties is unavailable.” Khan v. Dell 
Inc., 669 F.3d 350, 350-51 (3d Cir. 2012). 
99 Id. at *3. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at *4. 
102 9 U.S.C. §3. 
103 Tillman v. Tillman, __ F.3d __, No. 13-56624, 2016 WL 3343785 (9th 
Cir. June 15, 2016). 
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the arbitrator fees.104  In Tillman, a legal malpractice action arising 
out of a wrongful death lawsuit, defendant law firm first moved to 
compel arbitration and stay the court action based on an arbitration 
clause in its retainer agreement with the widow, Mrs. Tillman.105  
The district court granted the motion, and the parties proceeded to 
arbitrate their dispute at the American Arbitration Association 
(AAA) as provided for in their agreement.106  
 
In the arbitration, Mrs. Tillman was unable to deposit 
$18,562.50 required by the AAA as a condition of continuing the 
proceedings.  Thus, pursuant to AAA Rules, the arbitrator 
terminated the arbitration due to the insufficient deposit.107  The 
firm then moved in district court under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 41(b) to lift the stay and dismiss Mrs. Tillman’s 
complaint for failure to comply with the court order to arbitrate.  In 
response, Mrs. Tillman submitted an affidavit attesting to her 
financial condition and inability to pay the arbitration deposit.108   
 
The district court ultimately dismissed the complaint, 
though not pursuant to Rule 41(b).  The court instead reasoned 
that, because the AAA’s rules required the parties “to bear the 
costs of arbitration equally and allowed the arbitrator to suspend 
the proceedings,” the FAA “deprived the district court of authority 
to hear ‘the claims that would have been subject to the arbitration 
agreement,’ and dismissal was required.”109   
                                                 
104 The Tenth Circuit ruled similarly this past year. See Pre-Paid Legal 
Services, Inc. v. Cahill, 786 F.3d 1287 (10th Cir. 2015) (lifting stay of 
action pending arbitration because employee defendant failed to pay his 
share of arbitration fees and arbitrators terminated arbitration). 
105 2016 WL 3343785, at *1-2. 
106 Id. at *2. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 




On appeal, the Ninth Circuit ruled that, under FAA §3, the 
district court had the power to lift the stay of the court proceedings 
and allow the court case to go forward.110  Since the AAA’s rules 
expressly allowed the arbitrator to terminate the arbitration 
proceeding without entering an award or judgment when one party 
failed to make a required deposit, the court concluded that Mrs. 
Tillman’s arbitration had been “had in accordance with the terms 
of the [arbitration] agreement” under FAA §3.111  The Court of 
Appeals noted that no section of the FAA compels a court to 
dismiss a case once the arbitration had concluded in accordance 
with agreed-upon rules.112 
 
This unusual case strikes me as an alternative to the 
“effective vindication” doctrine for a disputant that can 
demonstrate he or she cannot afford arbitration forum fees and 
costs.  Rather than show the unaffordable arbitration fees strip the 
disputant of the right to pursue the claim, the disputant can rely on 
the procedural rules of the forum that permit a final dismissal of 
the arbitration if one party does not deposit fees.  The arbitration 
has thus “been had” within the meaning of FAA §3, allowing the 
case to go forward in court.  
 
                                                 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at *4 (quoting FAA §3). 
112 Id. at *6.  On a related question characterized as a “matter of first 
impression,” the Second Circuit ruled that the district court has the power 
to lift a stay, but not dismiss the action, when it refers all claims in the 
complaint to arbitration under FAA §3.  See Katz v. Cellco Partnership, 
794 F.3d 341 (2d Cir. 2015).  The court reasoned that a dismissal creates 
an immediately appealable order, which leads to more, not less, litigation, 
an outcome that is inconsistent with the FAA.  Id. at 345-46. 
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C. Defenses to Arbitrability Unique to FINRA 
Context 
 
1. Who is a “Customer” Under FINRA Rule 
12200? 
 
In FINRA arbitration, even in the absence of a PDAA in 
an agreement between the parties, a FINRA member firm must 
arbitrate a claim if “requested by a customer,” “[t]he dispute is 
between a customer and a member or associated person of a 
member; and [t]he dispute arises in connection with the business 
activities of the member or the associated person . . . .”113 
 
Thus, in a customer case, respondents may resist 
arbitration on the ground that claimant is not a “customer” of the 
FINRA member firm within the meaning of Rule 12200.  FINRA 
does not define “customer,” except for its mention in Rule 
12100(i) (a “customer shall not include a broker or dealer”), and 
courts struggle to define the term.  The leading definition is from 
Citigroup Global Markets Inc. v. Abbar.114 There, the Second 
Circuit issued “a bright-line rule” and held that “a ‘customer’ 
under FINRA Rule 12200 is one who, while not a broker or dealer, 
either (1) purchases a good or service from a FINRA member, or 
(2) has an account with a FINRA member.”115   
 
                                                 
113 FINRA R. 12200. 
114 761 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2014). 
115 Id. at 275.  See Dougherty v. VFG, LLC, 118 F. Supp. 3d 699, 713 
(E.D. Pa. 2015) (applying Abbar definition of “customer” and granting 
motion to compel brokerage firm to arbitrate). 
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However, in AXA Advisors, LLC v. Lee,116 the district 
court held that Abbar did not change the Second Circuit’s prior 
holding117 that a customer of an associated person who does not 
have an account with the associated person’s firm was nevertheless 
a “customer” of that firm under Rule 12200.  In Lee, investors who 
did not have accounts with AXA brought an arbitration proceeding 
against AXA arising out of losses from the “selling away” 
activities of an AXA registered representative.  AXA sued in 
federal court to enjoin the arbitration.118  While recognizing the 
utility of the Abbar definition of “customer,” the district court 
went further.  The Lee court concluded that the investors had the 
right to seek arbitration against AXA under Rule 12200 because 
they were customers of its associated person.119   
  
2. Can a Forum Selection Clause Trump the 
Duty to Arbitrate? 
 
A question related to “who is a customer” is whether a 
FINRA member’s duty to arbitrate at the request of a customer 
under Rule 12200 supersedes a forum selection clause in a 
customer agreement.  Last year’s update covered a recent Second 
Circuit case holding that it does not.120  This year, the Second 
                                                 
116 No. 1:15-CV-137-BLW, 2016 WL 335852 (D. Idaho Jan. 27, 2016) 
(slip op.) (compelling broker-dealer to arbitrate investors’ claim that its 
registered representative was “selling away” from the firm). 
117 See John Hancock Life Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 254 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 2001). 
118 Lee, 2016 WL 335852, at *1. 
119 Id. at *4. 
120 See Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Golden Empire Sch. Fin. Auth., 764 
F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2014).  But see Jill I. Gross, The Customer’s Non-
Waivable Right to Choose Arbitration in the Securities Industry, 10 
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 383 (2016) (arguing that recently 
amended section 29(a) of the Securities Exchange Act voids a forum 
selection clause in a customer agreement that purports to force a customer 
to waive its right to compel a FINRA member to arbitrate). 
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Circuit similarly held that a “more specific” forum selection clause 
in a broker-dealer’s employment agreement with an associated 
person trumped the firm’s duty to arbitrate a dispute with its 
employee under FINRA Rule 13200.121  
    
D. Vacating Arbitration Awards 
 
To successfully challenge an arbitration award that is 
governed by the FAA, parties must establish one of the four 
grounds for vacatur listed in FAA §10(a).122  Disputants rarely 
invoke section 10(a)(1) (“where the award was procured by 
corruption, fraud, or undue means”), but they more frequently 
invoke sections 10(a)(2)-(4), which are discussed below. 
 
 1. Evident Partiality  
 
Losing parties to arbitration awards can seek vacatur 
pursuant to FAA § 10(a)(2) if they show “evident partiality” in one 
or more arbitrators.  The Supreme Court’s only decision under that 
subsection is the 48-year old decision in Commonwealth Coatings 
v. Continental Casualty Co.,123 which yielded plurality and 
concurring opinions that are difficult to synthesize.  As a result, 
lower courts have had difficulty developing a test for “evident 
partiality,” since most circuits follow a version of the test set forth 
thirty years ago by the Second Circuit:124 “evident partiality” is 
                                                 
121 See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Tracy, 812 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 
2016).   
122 See Hall St. Assoc., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
123 393 U.S. 145 (1968). 
124 See Morelite Constr. v. New York City Dist. Council Carpenters Ben. 
Funds, 748 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1984).  
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“where a reasonable person would have to conclude that an 
arbitrator was partial to one party to the arbitration.”125 
 
Under that strict test, courts routinely reject claims of 
evident partiality.  Thus, it is unusual when a district court vacates 
an award on the ground that the arbitrator was biased.  It is even 
more notable when an appellate court reverses a vacatur on this 
ground – which happened several times in the past year.126 
 
For example, in Mendel v. Morgan Keegan & Co., 
plaintiff filed a FINRA arbitration against Morgan Keegan, 
claiming losses in mutual funds due to the fund’s investments in 
risky asset-backed securities.127  Though a unanimous panel 
awarded the investor $279,500.31, he challenged the arbitral award 
in Alabama state court, claiming that the award represented less 
than a tenth of his actual losses.128 
 
In his motion to vacate, Mendel argued that one of the 
panel members had an undisclosed potential conflict of interest 
because Mendel discovered post-hearing that the arbitrator’s 
employing law firm had previously represented Morgan Keegan in 
unrelated matters.129  However, Mendel did not show that the panel 
                                                 
125 Id. at 83. 
126 See, e.g., Ruhe v. Massimo Corp., __ F. App’x __, Nos. 14–55556, 
14–55725, 2016 WL 685115 (9th Cir. Feb. 19, 2016); Mendel v. Morgan 
Keegan & Co., __ F. App’x __, No. 15-12801, 2016 WL 3626783 (11th 
Cir. Mar. 23, 2016); Johnson v. Directory Assistants, Inc., 797 F.3d 1294 
(11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (reversing district court’s vacatur of award 
for evident partiality despite panelist’s disclosed past service as an 
arbitrator on a previous case involving the defendant and the undisclosed 
number of cases the defendant had at the forum). 
127 2016 WL 685115, at *1. 
128 Id. 
129 Id.  The arbitrator had disclosed the name of his law firm pre-hearing. 
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member actually knew of the conflict.130 After Morgan Keegan 
removed the case to federal court, the district court applied 
Alabama’s definition of “evident partiality” and vacated the award 
under §10(a)(2).131  
 
The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the Northern 
District of Alabama erred in applying Alabama state law rather 
than federal law in interpreting §10(a)(2).132  The Eleventh Circuit 
stated that, under federal law, there “are two ways to show evident 
partiality: (1) an actual conflict, or (2) knowing nondisclosure of a 
potential conflict.”133 The court concluded that Mendel did not 
meet this standard because he did not argue that the panel member 
was actually biased and did not show the panel member knew of 
but failed to disclose the potential conflict.134 Thus, the appellate 
court reversed the district court’s vacatur of the award. 
 
Is an arbitrator automatically “evidently partial” when the 
parties’ arbitration agreement provides for an arbitrator to assess 
the propriety of his own conduct?135  In an opinion arising out of 
the Tom Brady “Deflategate” scandal,136 the Second Circuit 
considered this very question.  There, the NFL Commissioner 
                                                 
130 Id. at *2. 
131 Id.  
132 Id. at *3.  But see Finn v. Ballentine Partners, LLC, __ A.3d __, 2016 
WL 3268852, *9 (NH June 14, 2016) (state law grounds for vacatur not 
preempted by FAA). 
133 Id. at *2 (quoting Gianelli Money Purchase Plan & Trust v. ADM 
Inv'r Servs., Inc., 146 F.3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 1998)).  
134 Id. at *3-4. 
135 Though this scenario is unlikely to occur in the FINRA context, it is 
conceivable that a FINRA arbitrator might be called upon to assess the 
propriety of a FINRA disciplinary ruling as a predicate for a claim 
brought in arbitration. 
136 Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council v. Nat'l Football League Players 
Ass'n, 820 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 2016).  
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suspended Tom Brady four games for allegedly deflating footballs 
in a championship game more than permitted.  Brady demanded 
arbitration to challenge the suspensions pursuant to the NFL 
Players Association’s collective bargaining agreement (CBA).137  
In the CBA, the parties agreed that the NFL Commissioner would 
serve as the arbitrator.  After arbitration, the Commissioner upheld 
the discipline that he had imposed.    
 
The Players Association moved to vacate the award on 
numerous grounds, and the district court granted the motion.  On 
appeal, the Second Circuit reversed.  The Court of Appeals 
rejected, inter alia, the Players Association’s contention that the 
NFL Commissioner who served as the arbitrator was “evidently 
partial” because he was “adjudicating the propriety of his own 
conduct.”138  Because the CBA provided that the Commissioner 
would serve as arbitrator, the Court of Appeals concluded that 
“parties to an arbitration can ask for no more impartiality than 
inheres in the method they have chosen.”139 
 
2. Refusal to Hold a Hearing 
 
 A court can vacate an award under FAA §10(a)(3) if the 
losing party shows “the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in 
refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or 
in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the 
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of 
                                                 
137 Id. at 531-32. 
138 Id. at 548. The Players Association claimed that the Commissioner 
had improperly delegated his disciplinary authority during the 




any party have been prejudiced.”140  The Second Circuit recently 
interpreted this ground: 
 
Vacatur under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) is warranted only when 
the arbitration proceedings were ‘fundamentally unfair.’ 
Fairness requires arbitrators to give a party an ‘adequate 
opportunity to present its evidence and argument,’ but it 
does not require them to ‘hear all the evidence proffered 
by a party.’  Moreover, ‘[a]rbitrators have substantial 
discretion to admit or exclude evidence.’141 
In Akpele v. Pac. Life Ins. Co.,142 a widow arbitrated 
negligence and intentional torts claims against defendants after she 
discovered that she was not named as a beneficiary in three of her 
husband’s retirement accounts.143  At the hearing, plaintiff offered 
into evidence a defined benefit plan and its trust document, 
sponsored by her late husband’s medical practice, presumably to 
show that spousal consent was required to change a beneficiary.144  
The panel excluded the two documents, however, because plaintiff 
did not produce the documents in a timely manner in violation of 
FINRA discovery rules.145  
 
After she lost in arbitration, plaintiff moved to vacate the 
award under this section, claiming the panel’s preclusion of the 
two documents was arbitrator misconduct under section 10(a)(3).  
                                                 
140 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3). 
141 Glob. Gold Min., LLC v. Ayvazian, 612 F. App'x 11, 14 (2d Cir. 
2015) (internal citations omitted). 
142 __ F. App’x __, No. 15-11529, 2016 WL 1319354 (11th Cir. Apr. 5, 
2016). 
143 Id. at *1.  Plaintiff claimed defendants improperly changed the 
beneficiary designated in the accounts. 




The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court’s conclusion 
that the exclusion of the documents was reasonable because of the 
discovery violation.  Further, the Court of Appeals agreed with the 
district court that the panel’s decision was not made in bad faith, 
and did not deprive plaintiff of a fair hearing.146 
 
 Similarly, the Second Circuit also rejected the argument 
that violation of the forum’s arbitral rules – in this case, an 
arbitrator’s disclosure obligations – could constitute arbitrator 
“corruption” or “misbehavior” within the meaning of section 
10(a)(1), (2) or (3).147  The Court of Appeals emphasized 
 
that the shipper's attempt to secure vacatur based on a 
violation of private arbitral rules runs headlong into the 
principle that parties may not expand by contract the 
FAA’s grounds for vacating an award. …if an arbitrator’s 
failure to comply with arbitral rules, without more, could 
properly be considered ‘corruption’ or ‘misbehavior,’ the 
FAA’s grounds for vacatur would be precisely as varied 
and expansive as the rules private parties might choose to 
adopt. We accordingly reject this argument.148 
 
 3. Exceeding Powers 
   
 Since arbitrators derive all of their authority to decide 
disputes from the parties’ arbitration agreement, a court can vacate 
an award under §10(a)(4) if the arbitrators exceed the authority 
provided by that agreement.  Under this ground for vacatur, courts 
consider only “whether the arbitrator (even arguably) interpreted 
                                                 
146 Id. 





the parties’ contract, not whether he got its meaning right or 
wrong.”149  Parties sometimes invoke this ground when 
challenging an award (or no award) of attorney’s fees, with 
varying success.150 
 
In Leeward Constr. Co., Ltd. v. Am. Univ. of Antigua-
Coll. of Med., the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
denial of a motion to vacate on a number of grounds, including 
“exceeding powers.”151  The losing party contended that the 
arbitrators exceeded their powers by not issuing a “reasoned 
award” as required.  The Court of Appeals first concluded that the 
arbitrators were in fact required to issue a reasoned award because 
they agreed to do so in the preliminary hearing.152  Next, the court 
considered, as a matter of first impression, the definition of a 
reasoned award.  The court wrote:   
 
[W]e …hold today that a reasoned award is something 
more than a line or two of unexplained conclusions, but 
something less than full findings of fact and conclusions of 
law on each issue raised before the panel. A reasoned 
award sets forth the basic reasoning of the arbitral panel on 
                                                 
149 Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068 (2013). 
150 See, e,g, Jones v. Dancel, 792 F.3d 395, 405 (4th Cir. 2015) (arbitrator 
did not exceed authority by declining to award additional attorney’s fees 
because he “interpreted the parties’ arbitration provision and the 
applicable legal authorities in rendering the award”); Beacon Towers 
Condo. Trust v. Alex, 42 N.E.3d 1144 (Mass. 2016) (affirming vacatur of 
arbitration award under Massachusetts law on ground that arbitrators 
exceeded their authority by awarding attorneys’ fees not authorized by 
PDAA or AAA rules). 
151 __ F.3d __, No. 13-1708-CV, 2016 WL 3457266, at *4 (2d Cir. June 
24, 2016). 
152 Id. at *3. 
35 
 
the central issue or issues raised before it. It need not delve 
into every argument made by the parties.153  
 
 I do not believe this definition of “reasoned award” applies 
to FINRA arbitration, because FINRA uses the term “explained 
decision” when the parties jointly request the arbitrator to include 
an explanation in the award.  Moreover, FINRA rules expressly 
define the term: “An explained decision is a fact-based award 
stating the general reason(s) for the arbitrators' decision. Inclusion 
of legal authorities and damage calculations is not required.”154 
 
 4. Manifest Disregard of the Law 
 
Since the Supreme Court’s holding in Hall St. Assoc., 
L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.155 that the FAA provides the exclusive 
grounds for review of an arbitration award and parties to an 
arbitration agreement cannot contractually expand the judicial 
grounds of review, the circuit courts have split on whether an 
arbitration panel’s “manifest disregard of the law” is a valid 
ground to vacate an arbitration award.  The Supreme Court 
expressly declined to resolve this split in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.156  The circuit split continues unchanged 
since last year’s Arbitration Law Update, (with one adjustment for 
the Fifth Circuit) as follows: 
 
 The Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits 
acknowledge the continued vitality of the “manifest disregard” 
ground of vacatur.157 
                                                 
153 Id. at *4. 
154 See FINRA R. 12904(g). 
155 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
156 559 U.S. 662, 672 n.3 (2010). 
157 See Singh v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., 633 F. App’x 548, 551 
(2d Cir. 2015) (affirming district court’s denial of motion to vacate on 
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 The Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have expressly 
ruled that manifest disregard is no longer a valid vacatur ground.158   
 The Fifth Circuit has held that manifest disregard 
is not available as a non-statutory ground for review,159 but this 
past year declined to decide whether it could be a statutory ground 
for review.160 
 The First and D.C. Circuits have addressed 
“manifest disregard” subsequent to Hall Street, but only in dicta.161 
                                                 
manifest disregard grounds and reaffirming principle that arbitrators need 
not provide any rationale for their award); Wachovia Sec., LLC v. Brand, 
671 F.3d 472, 482 (4th Cir. 2012) (“Although we find that manifest 
disregard continues to exist as either an independent ground for review or 
as a judicial gloss, we need not decide which of the two it is because 
Wachovia’s claim fails under both”); Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, 
L.L.C., 300 F. App’x 415, 419 (6th Cir. 2008); Comedy Club, Inc. v.  
Improv West Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir. 2009).  But see 
Schafer v. Multiband Corp., 551 F. App’x 814 (6th Cir. 2014) 
(suggesting that the Sixth Circuit might revisit the issue, “which has not 
been firmly settled”). 
158 See Medicine Shoppe Intern., Inc. v. Turner Inv., Inc., 614 F.3d 485 
(8th Cir. 2010); Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., 604 F.3d 1313, 1324 (11th 
Cir. 2010).  But see SBC Advanced Sols., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of 
Am., Dist. 6, 794 F.3d 1020, 1027 (8th Cir. 2015) (considering but 
ultimately rejecting merits of manifest disregard argument in labor 
arbitration). 
159 See Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 352 (5th Cir. 
2009). 
160 See McKool Smith, P.C. v. Curtis Int'l, Ltd., No. 15-11140, __ F. 
App’x __, 2016 WL 2989241, at *3 (5th Cir. May 23, 2016) (“While we 
have yet to explicitly decide whether the bases for vacatur asserted by 
Curtis can be statutory grounds for vacatur, we need not decide this issue 
today”). 
161 See Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Fenyk, 780 F.3d 59, 65 (1st 
Cir. 2015) (acknowledging that the circuit has “not squarely determined 
whether our manifest disregard case law can be reconciled with Hall 
Street”) (internal quotation and citation omitted); Affinity Fin. Corp. v. 
AARP Fin., Inc., 468 F. App’x 4, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (assuming without 
deciding that manifest disregard of the law standard survived Hall Street). 
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 The Third and Tenth Circuits have expressly 
declined to address the issue.162   
 The Seventh Circuit has held that “manifest 
disregard” is not a ground of vacatur, except if arbitrators order 
parties to violate the legal rights of others.163 
 
5. Waiver of Vacatur Right 
 
Finally, in a cautionary tale to parties to diligently research 
their arbitrators before the hearing, the Third Circuit held in the 
past year that a party can waive its right to challenge an award if it 
had constructive knowledge of the alleged ground of vacatur at the 
hearing.  In Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Athena Venture Partners, 
L.P.,164 the Court of Appeals held that the claimant had waived its 
right to challenge the award on the basis that one arbitrator had not 
made full disclosures.165 
 
                                                 
162 See Whitehead v. Pullman Grp., LLC, 811 F.3d 116, 120-21 (3d Cir. 
2016) (recognizing circuit split and expressly declining to decide that 
issue); Abbott v. Law Office of Patrick J. Mulligan, 440 F. App’x 612, 
620 (10th Cir. 2011) (“in the absence of firm guidance from the Supreme 
Court, we decline to decide whether the manifest disregard standard 
should be entirely jettisoned”).  
163 See Affymax, Inc. v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharm., Inc., 660 F.3d 
281, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Except to the extent recognized in George 
Watts & Son [v. Tiffany & Co., Inc., 248 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2001) (ruling 
that “a court may set aside an award that directs the parties to violate the 
legal rights of third persons who did not consent to the arbitration”)], 
‘manifest disregard of the law’ is not a ground on which a court may 
reject an arbitrator’s award under the Federal Arbitration Act.”). But see 
Renard v. Ameriprise Fin. Servs., Inc., 778 F.3d 563, 567 (7th Cir. 2015) 
(stating, in dicta, that an award can be vacated under §10(a)(4) “if the 
arbitrator deliberately disregards what he knows to be the law”) (internal 
quotation omitted). 
164 803 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2015). 
165 Id. at 150-51. 
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Athena brought a FINRA arbitration against Goldman 
Sachs (GS) for multi-million dollar losses in a GS product that 
claimed to be a short-term, low-risk investment. After losing the 
arbitration, Athena moved to vacate the award, arguing that a post-
award investigation revealed that a panel member, in addition to a 
disclosed [on the day of hearing] bar association complaint against 
him, had several other ethical and criminal complaints pending 
against him.166  
  
The district court granted Athena’s motion to vacate, 
finding that FINRA had failed to provide parties with three 
qualified arbitrators.167  GS appealed, arguing that Athena had 
waived its right to seek to vacate the award by failing to object 
during the FINRA hearing to the arbitrator’s incomplete and 
misleading disclosure.168  
 
The Third Circuit agreed with GS and reinstated the award 
in GS’s favor. The court stressed that a party should not wait until 
losing to begin its search for adverse information to use to 
challenge the award, and that the arbitrator’s initial disclosure 
should have been enough to provoke alarm in Athena.169  Because 
Athena had constructive knowledge of a basis to challenge the 
arbitrator’s participation and failed to do so until after an 
unfavorable award, it waived its right to seek vacatur on that 
basis.170 
                                                 
166 Id. at 145-46. 
167 Id. at 147. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. at 148-50. 
170 Id. at 150. 
